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MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR IssuEs. By David B. Wexler. 
New York: Plenum Books. 1981. Pp. x, 270. $25. 
The past decade has seen both substantial advances in the rights 
of the mentally ill and unprecedented judicial intervention into the 
administration of mental health services. These developments have 
been prompted, at least in part, by an ever-growing body of aca-
demic commentary criticizing the treatment of the mentally ill by 
both the legal system and mental health professionals.1 One of the 
most well-known and influential of those commentators is Professor 
David Wexler of the University of Arizona Law School. In Mental 
Health Law, Professor Wexler summarizes a number of his previ-
ously published articles on the effects of the legal system on the ad-
ministration of mental health services.2 Recognizing the "fully 
multidisciplinary" nature of mental health law, Wexler has at-
tempted to provide a "quasi-treatise" that will aid "students, re-
searchers, and practitioners" in a number of different fields (pp. 2-3). 
To correspond to what he sees as the two major categories of 
developments in mental health law (p. 3), Professor Wexler has di-
vided his book into two parts. In Part I, he discusses theoretical and 
practical problems of the civil and criminal commitment systems 
that have already been covered extensively by other writers.3 Part II 
examines the legal restrictions that courts have placed on therapists' 
treatment of their mentally ill patients. Wexler concludes, contrary 
to the view of many mental health professionals, that certain of these 
restrictions have actually resulted in more effective treatment. As a 
1. The right to treatment, for example, appears to have originated in two articles that advo-
cated the recognition of such a right. See Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499 
(1960); Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 28 (1960). 
2. The following works by Wexler form the basis for the content of Mental Health Law: 
The Administration of Psychiatric Justice: Theory and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 
(1971) (with S. Scoville et. al); Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (1972); Therapeutic Jus-
tice, 51 MINN. L. REV. 289 (1972); Token and Taboo: Behavior Modification, Token Economies 
and the Law, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 81 (1973); Foreword· Mental Health Law and the Movement 
Toward Voluntary Treatment, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (1974); Of Rights and Reinfarcers, 11 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 957 (1974); Behavior Modification and Other Behavior Change Procedures: The 
Emerging Law and the Proposed Florida Guidelines, 11 CRIM. L. B_ULL. 600 (1975); CRIMINAL 
COMMITMENTS AND DANGEROUS MENTAL PATIENTS (1976); Criminal Commitment Contin-
gency Structures, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 121 (B. Sales ed. 1977); Foreword· Cur-
rent Currents in Institutionalization, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 979 (1977);A Definite Maybe: Proof 
and Probability in Civil Commitment, 2 LAW & HUM. BEHAVIOR 37 (1978) (with J. Monahan); 
Patients, Therapists, and Third Parties: The Victimological Virtues ofTarasoff, 2 INTL. J.L. & 
PSYCH. 1 (1979). 
3. See, e.g., B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, 
AND THE LAW (1972); K. MILLER, MANAGING MADNESS (1976); A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH 
AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSmON (1975); T. SZASZ, PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE (1965); T. 
SZASZ, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYCHIATRY (1963). 
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response to critics of judicial intervention, therefore, Part II should 
spark considerable interest among members of the mental health 
community. 
One of the focal points of Part II is a discussion of the therapist's 
"duty to warn," which emerged in Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univer-
sity of Ca!!fornia .4 In this 1976 case, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia ruled that a psychiatrist who learns or should have learned that 
his patient poses a serious threat of violence to another person must 
attempt to protect the potential victim from harm. Frequently, the 
adequate discharge of this duty will require a psychiatrist to warn 
the potential victim of the danger. Not surprisingly, Tarasoff set off 
a storm of protest in the psychiatric community. Mental health pro-
fessionals argued, quite plausibly, that patients would not be com-
pletely honest if they knew that their thoughts and feelings might be 
• discussed outside of the therapist's office. Without complete candor 
on the part of patients, they claimed, the prospects for successful 
treatment would greatly diminish. 
Wexler rejects this view, and sees Tarasoff as a potential catalyst 
for much-needed changes in the treatment of mentally ill patients. 
According to Wexler, violence-prone patients who feel hostility to-
ward particular individuals, such as spouses or lovers, could be 
treated more effectively with some form of group, rather than indi-
vidual, therapy (p. 168). Wexler believes that attempts to treat the 
patient without the presence of the potential victim, whose behavior 
frequently triggers the patient's hostility, are doomed to failure. 
Tarasoff may inspire the therapist to contact the potential victim and 
gradually work him into the patient's therapy sessions. This type of 
participation, Wexler argues, may eventually lead to more effective 
therapy for violence-prone patients (pp. 175-76).5 
Wexler also supports court decisions that restrict the use of be-
havior modification programs in mental hospitals. Behavior modifi-
cation is often used to treat long-term psychotic patients who have 
failed to respond to conventional therapy. One common behavior 
modification technique calls for the establishment of a "token econ-
omy," in which patients are provided with the bare minimum of 
4. 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976), vacating 13 Cal. 3d 117,529 P.2d 
553, 118 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1974). 
5. Wexler extensively reviews the literature on victimology, the study of how victims of 
violence engage in behavior that precipitates their own injury. He cites studies showing that 
frequently, until the moment that the offender strikes out and causes harm, the roles of of-
fender and victim are virtually interchangeable. There is no way for a casual observer to 
predict who will be the aggressor and who will be the victim. P. 166. For further discussion of 
victimology, see Arison, Victims of Homicide, in 4 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus 55 (I. 
Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1975); Silverman, Victim Precipitation: An Examination of the Con-
cept, in l VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus 99 (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds. 1974); Wolfgang, 
Victim Precipitated Criminal Homicide, 48 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sc1. I (1957). 
See generally the volumes of VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus (I. Drapkin & E. Viano eds,). 
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creature comforts - a bed in a crowded ward, unappetizing food, no 
outside activities, and no television. To acquire any improvements 
in their spartan existence, patients must cooperate with the hospital 
staff. By engaging in certain desired behavior, such as improved 
self-grooming and participation in therapy sessions, patients can 
earn tokens. These tokens can then be used to purchase desired 
amenities. 
Token economy programs are threatened, however, by recent 
court decisions that have established the constitutional rights of 
mental patients to a long list of basic amenities. In Wyatt v. 
Stickney, 6 for example, a federal district court held that a mental 
patient is entitled to a comfortable bed with adequate privacy, good 
food, visitation rights, and grounds privileges. According to many 
behaviorists, the trend toward guaranteeing patients more amenities 
is counter-productive because it removes the incentive for self-im-
provement - the primary goal of behavior modification therapy. If 
patients have all of the creature comforts that they desire, therapists 
ask, why should they change their behavior to obtain more? By un-
dermining token economy programs, courts may be denying ther-
apists access to one of their most effective tools. 
These arguments for restricting patients' rights, however, do not 
persuade Wexler. He argues that token economy programs relying 
on deprivation have not been notably successful. Although patients 
in these programs may respond by working in the institution, they 
are not prepared to function independently in the real world (p. 
225).7 And the price paid for these meager results is the violation of 
the patients' dignity and self-respect. These criticisms are especially 
significant in light of the other successful token economy programs 
identified by Wexler that use much less degrading means to motivate 
patients. In these projects, careful observations of individual pa-
tients revealed idiosyncratic desires (e.g., to feed kittens, to eat soft-
boiled eggs instead of hard-boiled ones, and to order items from a 
mail-order catalogue). Therapists can play upon these desires to mo-
tivate patients as effectively as they can by denying them basic neces-
6. 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, and remanded in part sub. 
nom Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). For examples of other cases where the 
courts have recognized rights to basic amenities for patients in mental institutions, see Scott v. 
Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 947 (3d Cir. 1976); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915, 922 (N.D. Ohio 
1980); New York State Assn. for Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 717 (E.D.N.Y. 
1975). 
7. As an alternative to token economies, Wexler discusses the experiments of George Fair-
weather. Using the principles of social psychology and small group therapy, Fairweather suc-
ceeded in moving many chronic psychotics out of the hospital and into cooperative 
communities. His programs provided all patients with television, movies, magazines, good 
food, and weekly passes, regardless of their progress in the program. Pp. 226-28. See G. 
FAIRWEATHER, D. SANDERS, H. MAYNARD, D. CRESSLER & D. BLECK, COMMUNITY LIFE 
FOR THE MENTALLY ILL (1969); SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN TREATING MENTAL ILLNESS (G. 
Fairweather ed. 1964). 
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sities (p. 226). By expanding patients' legal rights, Wexler concludes, 
judicial intervention has forced therapists to find more humane in-
centives for motivating their patients. 
In these two examples, and throughout the book, Wexler at-
tempts to downplay what some have viewed as the adversarial na-
ture of the relationship between courts and therapists. Wexler sees 
the law not as an obstacle to the therapeutic process, but as an aid in 
ensuring that an individual's dignity and self-respect are preserved 
- the ultimate product of any successful program of therapy. This 
lesson is an important one for lawyers involved in mental health ad-
vocacy and for mental health professionals who are worried about 
the effects of such advocacy on the commitment and treatment of the 
mentally ill. One can only hope that the lesson will not be lost on 
the courts, which now seem increasingly unwilling to expand upon 
the protections afforded institutionalized individuals. 8 
8. See, e.g., Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
